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Abstract. This article describes aspects of social and political human functioning that are germane to
security violations discovered by representatives of the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) in tests at various
United States (U.S.) airports. FAA reports on the violations were obtained by The New York Times
through the U.S. Freedom of Information Act and discussed in the Times' January 11th Issue.
Human factors research on aviation security seems to most often focus on psychophysical and artificial
intelligence-based cognitive aspects of the human-machine interface. Questions are asked and
answered such as the following: What are the optimal degrees of brightness for an x-ray screen monitor
in various environments to minimize "eye fatigue" and related misperception of and inattention to
stimuli through time? What are the optimal values of frequency and amplitude for specific sounds in
specific environments to maximize these sounds' detection? How can one best define information
overload so that accurate and efficient information processing through heuristics can best occur during
detection tasks?
Such psychophysical and cognitive aspects have been and continue to be significant to aviation security.
Research on them should continue. However, if The New York Times reporting on FAA tests of security
at U.S. airports are to be believed, there is a human element of human factors--the social and political
aspects--that needs to be much more frequently and intensively addressed through basic and applied
research, in FAA testing, and in airline security management.
For example, airline personnel at ticketing counters and at security checkpoints are required to be
courteous to customers, to avoid--if possible-- "bothering" or "hassling" people, and to expedite
processing so flights can leave on time. How are inevitable tradeoffs among such requirements made,
and how should they be made busy professionals in the heat of their work shifts? How should they be
made so that security concerns are given proper and necessary import on the one hand, but do not
sabotage the business interests of the airlines and the professional and personal agendas of customers
on the other?
According to FAA findings, decisions are sometimes made so that people carrying guns that have been
set off detector devices are still allowed to proceed to their gates for boarding. (Of course the security
personnel is almost always aware that a detector "goes off" and must determine a plan of action based
on heuristics about false alarms set off by detector malfunction and miscalibration, true alarms set off
by innocuous objects, and true alarms set off by objects that are anything but innocuous in the context
of competing job requirements.) Seemingly irrational questions about when a package to be checked in
was given to a passenger by a stranger are used to allow the passenger to proceed. (How can this matter
unless a weapon has the half-life of a fleeting moment?) Security personnel are seemingly given great
latitude in interpreting the social meaning and import of detected stimuli on x-ray screens--e.g., a
grenade is socially perceived as a compact makeup case in a response set that can be exploited in rogue
military aid programs wherein grenades may be inventoried as door stops.)
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As another example of more interpersonal concern, a male security officer failed to find a gun concealed
under the clothes of a female passenger--actually a tester working with the FAA. In an after-action
assessment, it seems to have turned out that the security officer had inadvertently physically touched
the woman's chest with his hand wand. Allegedly, this made him very self-conscious about avoiding
touching the woman again. To this end, he held the hand wand farther away from the woman's body
than prescribed by operating procedure--thereby ensuring the gun would not be detected. Whether it
happened this way or not, this would seem to be an example of a litigious, highly-sensitive, anti-sexual
harassment environment leading to the threat or employment of criminal lethal force.
The future of human factors research supporting aviation security needs to take two pathways: the
psychophysical and artificial intelligence-based cognitive on the one hand, the social and political on the
other. Interestingly, these are also the two routes competent criminals take in attempting to violate
aviation security. And one final point. The headline of the Times article is "Tests Show Holes in Airline
Security." Researchers, policymakers, security personnel, and the general public need to remember that
there are always holes in security. These holes should not necessarily be used to attack competent and
well-meaning professionals doing their job. Instead, ongoing decisions need to be made about what
kinds of holes can be tolerated given existing assets and the security threat. The failure to make this
case is a hole in the Times article about aviation security. (See Airport Security and Passenger Profiling:
Issues of Substantive, Procedural, and Distributive Justice. (October 16, 1998). IBPP, 5(16); Civil Aviation
Security: Federal Aviation Agency. http://cas.faa.gov; Wald, M.L. (January 11, 1999). Tests show holes in
airline security. The New York Times, pp. A1; A13; Critiquing Critiques of Profiling in Aviation Security
Screening Programs: Why the ACLU Has It Wrong. (January 9, 1998). IBPP, 4(1); How Standards and
Accountability Lead to Safety and Security Violations at Nuclear Weapons Plants. (April 3, 1998). IBPP,
4(13).) (Keywords: Aviation Security, Human Factors.)
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